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Washington, D.C. 20505

## DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

3 February 1982

MEMORANDUMLogistic Requirements of the Salvadoran Insurgents

25X1 [redacted] in preparation for their  
"final" offensive of January 1981, the Salvadoran insurgents  
hoped to receive some 600-800 tons of arms, ammunition, and other  
25X1 material from various Communist donors via Cuba and Nicaragua.

[redacted]

25X1 [redacted]  
25X1 [redacted] only some 200 tons were actually  
transferred to El Salvador prior to the offensive, with the  
remainder still tied up in the Cuba-Nicaragua pipeline. Thus  
after the offensive, we saw continued efforts by the Sandinistas  
to move arms to the Salvadoran insurgents. [redacted]

[redacted]

US protests and the effectiveness of Honduran interdiction  
apparently led to a reduction in the arms flow. After the  
failure of their "final" offensive, the guerrillas adopted

25X1 This memorandum was requested by Senator Dodd. It was prepared by [redacted]  
[redacted] Middle  
America/Caribbean Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis and  
contains information available as of 3 February 1982. Questions and comments  
are welcome and should be directed to Chief, Middle America Division, OALA,  
25X1 [redacted]

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sabotage, ambushes, and harassment action rather than large-scale assaults as their basic combat tactic. This allowed them to conserve ammunition and was consistent with the reduced arms flow. [REDACTED]

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In order to launch large scale sustained operations, we estimate that the 5,000 Salvadoran insurgents would require about 150 tons of ammunition per month. [REDACTED]

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